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I. INTRODUCTION
Dumping and antidumping responses have become major
concerns of the world trading system. The current operative
excesses of national regimes are cause for concern. For
example, the antidumping rules of the European Economic
community ("EC")1 are under pressure because of the
perception that they are being used in a protectionist
manner. Such behavior is made all the more troublesome by
the inability of exporters to gain meaningful judicial
review of dumping measures.2 Clearly all is not well. In
the view of the many, the dynamics of the national trade
politics have led inexorably to creeping "procedural
protectionism1l3 in antidumping laws, as administering
authorities and legislatures develop rules and practices
that increasingly tilt decision-making processes in favor of
1 See, e.g., The Abuse of Antidumping, Fin. Times, Sept.
5, 1988, at 20, col. 1.; cassidy, Danger: Protectionist
Influences at work, Fin. Times, sept. 8, 1988, at 25, col. 1
(letter).; Hindley, The High Cost of EC Dumping Policy, Fin.
Times, Nov. 25, 1988, at 13, col. 1 (letter).; The Antidumping
Dodge, Economist, Sept. 10, 1988, at 77.
2 See Lockett, EEC Antidumping Law and Trade Policy After
Ballbearing II: Discretionary Decisions Masquerading as Legal
Process?, 8 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 365 (1987).
3 See Ken. Matsumoto & Grant. Finlayson, Dumping and
Antidumping: Growing Problems in World Trade, 24 J. of World
Trade 6 (1990).
1
62
domestic interests. These trends are commonly seen in each
of the traditional users of the antidumping laws (Australia,
Canada, the European Community and the United states), and
there are several signs that this form of non-tariff
protection is beginning to spread rapidly among developing
t. 4coun rJ.es.
On the other hand, in the growing literature on
antidumping policies, there appears to be a presumption that
the problem with antidumping policies is mostly caused by
the national implementation of international rules.5 The
antidumping regime exists at two distinct levels: national
and international. The reasons for the enactment of the
national rules are not the same as the reasons for the
establishment of the international principles. Those who
argue that the national rules as instruments of national
trade policy are outdated and ought to be abolished should
be made to address the question of whether the international
principles have also lost their validity.6 If nations
decide not to apply antidumping rules because of domestic
objections, such an unilateral decision does not necessarily
4 See generally, Patrick Messerlin, Experiences of
Developing Countries with Antidumping Laws (1988).
5 See Phedon Nicolaides, Does the International Trade
System Need Antidumping Rules?, 14 World Competition 103
(1990) .
See Ross Denton, (Why)Should Nations utilize
Antidumping Measures?, 11 Mi. J. Int'l Law 225 (1989).
3call into question the role of the international principles.
Where the differences in national economies and cultures
give rise to different pricing practices, and those
practices result in injury to the producers in one country,
some mechanism is needed to serve as a "buffer" or an
"interface" device,7 that will allow different economies to
interact without undue disruption to their economy.
It steers an often difficult course between advocating
tighter controls on the use of antidumping actions as
protectionist measures, and their use to prevent potentially
harmful dumping. The GATT principles on antidumping are in a
state of tension, serving two opposing purposes. The first
purpose is to liberalize trade movements, in some measure
attempting to rid the world of harmful distortions. Such a
function would concentrate primarily on the private act of
price discrimination. This purpose is, however, contentious.
The second and more familiar purpose of the GATT principles
is to provide procedural and substantive safeguards against
the abuse of national antidumping rules. This purpose looks
to the public act of protectionism through the use of
antidumping actions. This is clearly a concern of the GATT
antidumping regime and provided most of the impetus towards
the creation of the two Antidumping Codes.
7 See J. Jackson & W. Davey, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials, and Text
on the National and International Regulation of Transnational
Economic Relations 650-52 (2d ed. 1986).
4However, the traditional antidumping laws have lost
their ability to deal effectively with new problems
associated with dumping in an increasingly global economy.
For example, multinational companies source components and
assemble goods in many different countries simultaneously,
and they may be able to "circumvent" traditional antidumping
protection by shifting source locations or setting up local
"screw driver" assembly plants.8 without some modification
to adapt antidumping laws to economic circumstances of this
sort, antidumping measures will increasingly lose their
capacity to play an effective interface role in the
international trade.
Periods, during which negotiation takes place to
formulate reductions in trade barriers under the auspices of
the GATT agreement, as well as to amend the articles of the
agreement, are called rounds. The word "rounds" connotes
that the process of liberalizing trade resembles a fight.
The most recent negotiating period conference was the
"Uruguay Round" held at the GATT headquarters in Geneva, and
originally scheduled to last from the end of 1986 to the end
of 1990.
8 See willy de Clercq, Fair Practice, Not Protectionism,
Financial Times (London), Nov. 21, 1988.
5Part II of this paper will review the principles of
the GATT9 and current trends in national implementation.
Part III will identify the extent to which antidumping
issues have been discussed during the Uruguay Round and to
analyze so-called "Dunkel Drafts"lO. The purpose of this
part is to discuss the issues and to highlight some of the
changes by describing the contents of the change and, where
appropriate, cross-referencing the change to an existing
provision.
with more desirable changes, a better legal framework
could be created whereby both existing as well as
prospective antidumping laws would be expected to conform
to. The suggestions will also be discussed at the end of the
part III of this paper.
That the control of national antidumping regimes is
currently the most important aspect of the international
principles (and has been since the 1960s}.11 The national
antidumping actions need to examine the effect of imports on
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents 3 (1969) [hereinafter BISD].
10 See GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, "Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade" ("AD Draft") (1991) [hereinafter Dunkel
Drafts] .
11 See Ross Denton, supra note 6, at 224.
6competition, and not only on competitors. Such an obligation
could be undertaken either unilaterally by nations or as a
result of international agreement.
Part IV concludes that it is important to return to
the original principle12 of the trade liberalization, even
if such a principle under the GATT has been in large part
discredited.
12 See J. Jackson, Dumping: Substantial Reform of GATT
Antidumping Code seem to be Difficult to Achieve in Uruguay
Round, 7 ITR 397 (1990).
II. ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND THE CURRENT TRENDS IN
IMPLEMENTATION
A. International Antidumping Laws
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade13(GATT or
General Agreement) is recognized as 'the most important
agreement regulating trade among nations,14. It is intended
to facilitate the development of world resources; raise
standards of living; increase real income; and expand the
production and exchange of goods. 15To achieve these
objectives, GATT is directed at "the substantial reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
13 See supra note 9.
14 See J. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and
Policy of International Economic Relations 27 (1989)
[hereinafter J. Jackson, World Trading System] (GATT most
important treaty governing international trade relations); A.
Lowenfeld, Public Controls on International Trade 22 (2d ed.
1983) (GATT most important worldwide agency devoted to
regulation of international commerce); Note, Labor Rights
Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the
International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 87 (1990)
(GATT only internationally recognized regime for trade
regulation); see also J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of
GATT 3 (1969) [hereinafter J. Jackson, World Trade] (little
doubt GATT has contributed to purpose of establishing improved
international trade order).
15 See GATT, supra note 9, preamble.
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8elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce" .16 GATT has been surprisingly successful. Despite
a tumultuous beginning and endemic structural frailties,
GATT "has arguably done more over the past 40 years to
promote the cause of peace and prosperity than any other
international body". 17
One of the barriers to free trade that GATT seeks to
eliminate is the "dumping" of merchandise by one country
into another country's market. Stated generally, dumping is
the sale of products in a foreign market at a price less
than "the normal value of the products" in the home
market.18 This prohibition is predicated on the assumption
that dumping is not based on superior efficiency but is an
attempt to injure or destroy competition.19 GATT permits a
country to respond to dumping that causes or threatens
16 Id.; see also J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 7, at
8.
17 See The Times (London), Feb. 8, 1991, at 21
(International Chamber of Commerce stating that GATT "has
powered the greatest expansion of global living standards in
the history of humankind").
18 GATT, supra note 9, art. VI, para. l(a); J. Jackson,
World Trading system, supra note 14, at 221. Where no
comparable home market price exists, GATT allows the use of
production costs in the country of origin or market prices in
comparable countries to determine whether dumping has
occurred. See GATT, supra note 9, art. VI, para. l(b).
19 For a detailed discussion of why a foreign company
would want to dump, see text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
9material injury to domestic industries by levying a duty on
the product "not greater in amount than the margin of
dumping in respect of such product". 20
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was
completed and signed as an international trade agreement on
October 30, 1947.21 originally, GATT was intended to be
subordinate to the yet unfinished International Trade
Organization (ITO)22 and was not to come into effect until
23the ITO was established formally. For numerous reasons,
however, many negotiators argued that GATT should be brought
into force as soon as possible.24 To placate their
20 GATT, t 9 t VI 2supra no e , ar. , para ..
21 GATT, supra note 9; see also K. Dam, The GATT: Law and
International Economic organization 335 (1970) (GATT not
organization but merely multilateral agreement); J. Jackson,
World Trade, supra note 14, at 35-57.
22 J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14, at
32-34. The ITO charter was to be completed in 1948.
In addition to imposing a "code of conduct" on
government restraints on international trade, the ITO was
intended to collect statistics, produce uniform definitions
and classifications, issue guidelines for customs valuations,
and resolve trade disputes.
; see also A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 16.
23 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 32-34; see also J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at
62 (governments have authority to agree to lower tariffs but
cannot, without parliamentary approval, agree to nontariff
barriers of GATT); J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 7, at 295
(discussing requirement of parliamentary approval).
24 The principal reason was the concern for getting the
tariff reduction portions of the General Agreement in
operation quickly. See Second Session of the Preparatory Comm.
of the united Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (1st
10
concerns, GATT was to be applied provisionally until a
definitive application could be achieved.25 As a
provisional measure, GATT was to have limited force and
would not affect a contracting party's prior legislation
26that was inconsistent with the General Agreement. It was
assumed that when the ITO charter finally was submitted,
GATT would be submitted for "definitive" application as
27well.
However, this plan did not materialize as envisioned.
The ITO charter never was approved, largely because of
opposition in the united states congress,28 thrusting the
dual roles of multinational trade agreement and
mtg.) at 3, 23-24, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV/1 (1947).
25 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 35.
This agreement provided that contracting parties
would undertake to "apply provisionally on and after 1 January
1948: (a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, and (b) Part II of that Agreement to the
fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation."
26 See Rogoff & Gauditz, The Provisional Application of
International Agreements, 39 Me. L. Rev. 29, 67 (1987); see K.
Dam, supra note 21, at 342 (The Protocol is "one of the
principal weaknesses of the General Agreement as a
codification of a rule of law in economic affairs".).
27 See J. Jackson, World Trading system, supra note 14,
at 36; J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 7, at 295.
28 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 20-21; see J.
Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 50.
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international organization upon GATT.29 GATT has lumbered
along in this dual capacity without adequate legal
structures or a basic constitution for over forty years.30
1. The Principles of GATT
First of all, trade liberalization is the fundamental
point in terms of modern international economic
relations.31 "Liberal trade" is committed to minimizing the
amount of government interference in trade crossing national
32borders. GATT explicitly endorses this principle in its
preamble, stating that the General Agreement is directed
toward the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade". 33 As such, GATT generally is opposed to
29 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 33, 38 (although intended as multilateral treaty, GATT is
international organization); see also J. Jackson, World Trade,
supra note 14, at 119-22 (discussing whether GATT is
international organization).
30 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 51 (upon
failure of ITO, GATT found itself without adequate legal and
constitutional base); J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra
note 14, at 38 (GATT lacks basic "constitution" designed to
regulate its organizational activities and procedures) .
31 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 8.
32 Id.
33 GATT, supra note 9, preamble; see also A. Lowenfeld,
supra note 14, at 23 (GATT committed to keeping government
restraints of trade to minimum) .
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both tariffM and nontariff barriers.~ Although the
preferred approach is simply to prohibit nontariff
barriers,36 regulation of the barrier is a viable
alternative where prohibition is not feasible due to the
complicated or controversial nature of the barrier (as is
true with antidumping laws) .37 Furthermore, the only
changes in trade permissible under GATT are those reducing
the obstacles to free trade.~
Another fundamental principle of GATT is
nondiscriminatory trading.39 Specifically, all contracting
parties are obligated to treat all other contracting parties
40equally and to accord products of foreign origin no less
M See K D t 21 t 17. am, supra no e ,a .
35 See ide at 19. Nontariff barriers are impediments to
the free flow of goods or services in international trade
other than tariffs, such as dumping, government subsidies, and
quotas. see L. Glick, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: World
Trade After the Tokyo Round 7 n.6 (1984).
36 See K. Dam, supra note 21, at 19.
~ See ide at 19-20.
38 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 23 ("Government
restraints on the movement of goods should be kept to a
minimum, and if changed, should be reduced, not increased".).
39 See GATT, supra note 9, preamble (GATT directed at
"elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce"); A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 23 (same).
40 This principle is known as "most-favored-nation"
treatment. see GATT, supra note 9, art. I.
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favorable treatment than products of domestic origin.41 A
primary motivation behind this principle is to prevent
domestic taxes and regulatory policies from being used as
t t' 't ~pro ec lonlS measures.
Finally, GATT is founded on the principle that
conditions of trade should be discussed and agreed on within
a multilateral framework.43 As mentioned in the
introduction, Part I, GATT provides for multilateral tariffs
and trade negotiations, or "rounds", that are "reciprocal
and mutually advantageous" to all contracting parties and
are aimed at the substantial reduction of trade barriers.44
41 See GATT, supra note 9, art. III ("The products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use".). This principle is
known as "national treatment."
42 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 189.
43 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 23.
44 GATT, supra note 9, art. XXVIII, para. 1; J. Jackson,
World Trade, supra note 14, at 240-41; A. Lowenfeld, supra
note 14, at 23. The "rounds" include: Dillon Round (1962);
Kennedy Round (1963-67); Tokyo Round (1973-79); and Uruguay
Round (1987-91). See Martyn, International Trade: The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 199, 199
n.1 (1988).
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These principles are subject to various qualifications
and corollaries.45 Nevertheless, one cannot assess the
validity of action by a contracting party that may affect
international trade adversely or impinge upon the rights and
obligations of another contracting party except by reference
to the fundamental principles of liberalization,
nondiscrimination, and multilateral negotiation.
2. GATT and the Antidumping Laws
a. The Policies underlying Antidumping Laws
Antidumping laws are a type of "market corrective",
providing a remedy when a foreign industry engages in
certain unfair acts46 to the detriment of a domestic
industry. These acts are viewed as deviations from the
"natural" rules of efficient and competitive markets. 47
Antidumping laws, therefore, correct "exceptional events" by
imposing a duty raising the low price of imports to what it
45 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 24-27 (discussing
exceptions, grandfather clauses, and special cases).
46 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy of International
Trade, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 547, 549 (1987).
47 See ide
15
should have been if the foreign producer had operated under
the "normal" conditions of competi tive markets. 48
Generally, there are three types of dumping: sporadic,
continuous, and predatory.49 Sporadic dumping is the
occasional sale of overstock at low prices in a "fire sale"
fashion.50 In this situation, a foreign producer unloads
overstock in a nondomestic market so that its domestic price
51structure is not endangered. In contrast, a foreign
producer who dumps continuously assumes that its long-term
costs will be reduced if it manufactures a large number of
48 See id., at 550.; "Normal" condi tions are those
conditions prevailing without government intervention.
49 See J. Viner, Dumping : A Problem in International
Trade 1-22 (1966); Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United
States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 85, 88- 89, 144 (1973) [hereinafter Fisher, Antidumping
Law]; Fisher, Dumping: Confronting the Paradox of Internal
Weakness and External Challenge, in Antidumping Law: Policy
and Implementation 11, 13 (1979) [hereinafter Fisher,
Confronting the Paradox]. Some delegates at the drafting of
GATT argued that treatment should vary according to the type
of dumping. They proposed limiting the restriction on dumping
under article VI to only the practice of "systematical
dumping".
50 See Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 49, at
13. Whether antidumping laws can regulate sporadic dumping
effectively is an open question. ; see also J. Viner, supra
note 49, at 358-59 and John J. Barcelo, The Antidumping Law:
Repeal It or Revise It, in Antidumping Law: Policy and
Implementation 53, 70-75 (1979) (antidumping laws provide
inadequate relief for non-predatory injuries dumping) ;
Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 49, at 13
(sporadic dumping of little concern to importing country).
51 See J. Viner, supra note 49, at 23-24; Fisher,
Antidumping Law, supra note 49, at 88.
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items, thus realizing maximum economies of scale.52
Provided a product's average price exceeds its average cost
of production, the producer is assured a sustained profit
53from overall sales. Finally, predatory dumping is used to
strengthen or secure a foothold in a nondomestic market by
forestalling the development of competition or by
eliminating existing competition entirely.54 A foreign
producer will sell its product abroad at prices below
marginal cost for brief periods, driving out competitors.55
Once competition is limited severely, the foreign producer
then charges monopolistic prices for the product in the
target market, thus recouping its losses.56
52 See Fisher, Antidumping Law, supra note 49, at 89.
53 See ide Whether antidumping laws should regulate
continuous dumping also is contested. Compare Fisher,
Confronting the Paradox, supra note 49, at 13-14, 23 (arguing
that continuous dumping scheme cannot endure without
government regulation) with Barcelo, supra note 50, at 75-77
(products continuously dumped indistinguishable from other
imports) .
54 See Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note 49, at
13.
55 See J. Viner, supra note 49, at 26-27; Fisher,
Antidumping Law, supra note 49, at 88-89. J. Barcelo questions
the likelihood of international predatory dumping. See
Barcelo, supra note 54, at 65-66; Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as
Barriers to Trade--The united States and the International
Antidumping Code, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 491, 502 (1972).
56Monopolistic pricing can be sustained only if there are
high barriers to market entry. "[I]t is not enough simply to
achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick
entry by new competitors .... " Matsushita Elec. Indus. V.
Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1985).
17
For decades, injurious dumping has been considered
unfair. Both international and domestic rules have developed
permitting duties to be levied to offset such practices,57
even though the distinction between "fair" and "unfair"
trade increasingly has become blurred.58 The prevailing
explanation of why dumping practices are unfair is based on
market efficiency. Normally, those enterprises that survive
are the most efficient and thus deserve the benefits of
their efficiency.59 When, by means of dumping, a producer
receives benefits for reasons other than superior
efficiency, the market's normal function is undermined. A
producer, being able to reduce prices below cost because of
a subsidy received from higher prices elsewhere is deemed to
While it generally is agreed that predatory dumping is
condemnable and should be regulated, the issue is still
debated. Compare Fisher, Confronting the Paradox, supra note
49, at 13 (consensus is that predatory dumping is unfair trade
practice) with Barcelo, supra note 50, at 65-69 (same) and
Barcelo, supra note 55, at 500-02 (arguing that duties to
counteract predatory dumping produce chilling effects on price
competition and should be cautiously applied).
57 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 217. ; A. Lowenfeld has described the practice of dumping
facetiously as the "premier sin of international trade."
Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?, 13 Cornell
Int'l L.J. 205, 206 (1980).
58 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 217; J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 7, at 648; See
Lowenfeld, id., at 206.
59 See Robert E. Hudec, united States Compliance with the
1967 GATT Antidumping Code in Antidumping Law: Policy and
Implementation 205, 206 (1979); Tarullo, supra note 46, at
552-54.
18
be operating "unfairly". other producers should not be
forced to bear the loss from such unfair competitive
t. 60prac J.ces.
Trade laws aimed at unfair dumping practices typically
seek to "level the playing field,,61.Implicit in this
concept is the notion that a business that sells the same
product at different prices to different persons is acting
unfairly,62 and that it must set a single, universal price
based on the cost of production.63In particular, these laws
attempt to prevent predatory "price gouging"64 by which a
large, economically powerful firm uses other aspects of its
business to subsidize lower prices for a particular product
to undersell small businesses competing in the same market,
W See Hudec, id., at 206.
61 J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14, at
218. By attempting to "level the playing field," a government
seeks to preserve competi tive markets from foreign governments
advancing their own national objectives through subsidies or
from foreign manufacturers engaging in noncompeti tive
practices by dumping. See id., at 217.
62 See id. at 223; Jackson, Dumping in International
Trade, supra note 7, at 1, 4.
63 See Barcelo, supra note 50, at 59. Barcelo calls this
the "most important misconception about dumping".
64 Alan Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping
Law, in Antidumping Law and Practice 23, 25 (J. Jackson & E.
Vermulst eds. 1989).
19
eventually reducing competition so in the long run it can
raise prices and reap monopoly benefits.~
While the theoretical rationale behind antidumping
laws may be sound,66 their practical application is
considerably more problematic because not every instance of
differential pricing represents economic inefficiency or
predatory intent. "[T]here can be dumping for honorable and
to dump because it perceives technological change to be
supplier may set different domestic and export prices in
rational enterprise motives of competitive profit
For example, a rational, nonpredatory
66 This rationale is subj ect to the assumption that
predatory pricing permits an enterprise to hold on to its
price-cutting advantage long enough to recoup its initial
losses. Generally, see Esterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 265-76 (1981)
(discussing the likelihood of the recoupment to make predation
profitable) .
67 J. Jackson, Introduction: Perspectives on Antidumping
Law and Policy, in Antidumping Law: Policy and Implementation
1, 4 (1979) (emphasis in original).
~ See K. Dam, supra note 21, at 170 (difference in price
may reflect differences in competitive conditions); Barcelo,
supra note 50, at 59 ("A rational, nonpredatory supplier may
dump merely because he is responding to different demand
conditions in a genuine effort to maximize profits.").
.. t' 67maxlmlza lon."
65 See K. Dam, supra note 21, at 169; J. Jackson, World
Trading System, supra note 14, at 223-24; Fisher, Antidumping
Law, supra note 49, at 85, 87. The likely success of such a
scheme is subject to serious question. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. v. Zenith Radio, supra note 56, 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1985) (predatory pricing schemes rarely tried and even more
rarely successful).
response to varying demand conditions in a genuine effort to
maximize profits.68 Likewise, a corporation may be forced
20
moving so quickly that it must sell its inventory of a
particular product or run the risk of its obsolescence.69
Finally, a corporation may price a product lower in a
particular foreign market simply to meet competition in that
70market.
Insofar as antidumping laws fail to distinguish
procompetitive from anticompetitive dumping, their ultimate
effect will be higher consumer costs.71 Therefore, the
policies underlying antidumping laws often may be at odds
with the policies embodied in other laws governing trade,
particularly antitrust laws.72 Antitrust laws generally are
intended to benefit consumers.73 Antidumping laws, on the
other hand, protect domestic competitors from low-priced
imports even when such protection does not benefit consumers
69 See Memo from Finance Corom. Trade Staff to Finance
Corom. Members (1986), repr inted in 1986 Hear ing , note 93
infra, at 7.
70 See K. Dam, supra note 21, at 168.
71 See Barcelo, supra note 55, at 501 (mere existence of
antiprice discrimination laws produces some chilling effect on
price competition).
72 See E. Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems of Australia,
Canada, the EEC and the USA, supra note 64, at 425, 459.
73 See Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-- Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 957 (1987) (economics tool that can help
keep anti trust system on course to help consumers and to
facilitate dynamic competition).
21
or enhance competition.74 Antitrust policy favors vigorous
competition from all sources, including imports. Antidumping
policy seeks to protect domestic competitors from unfair
foreign price discrimination and is skeptical of vigorous
import competition.75 These policy differences often come
into sharp conflict, especially when antitrust laws76 are
viewed as a desirable substitute of remedying antidumping
activities,77 particularly in dealing with unreasonably low
price. This argument will be discussed in section C, part
III infra.
b. Antidumping Epitome
Special provisions specifically directed at dumping
were added during the negotiations of the General Agreement
74 See K. Dam, supra note 21, at 168 (dumping concerned
with protection of domestic industries from international
competition).
n See notes 14 and 94.
76 See Report of the Ad-Hoc Corom. on Antitrust and
Antidumping of the Am. Bar Assoc., 43 Antitrust L. J., 653,
691 (1974).
77 See Roger P. Alford, Why A Private Right of Action
against Dumping Would Violate GATT?, 66 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 696
(1991).; see also, note 165 infra.
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in 1947.~ After several drafts,N Article VI was finalized
to provide:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping,
by which products of one country are introduced
into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of the products, is to be
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury
to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry .... In order
to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party
may levy on any dumped product an antidumping duty
not greater in amount than the margin of
d. 80umpJ.ng....
As worded, Article VI is an "exception" to GATT, 81
allowing measures that contravene GATT's general principles
of trade liberalization and nondiscriminatory treatment.82
78 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 225;6 Jackson, supra note 67, at 6.
These special provisions were approved by the
negotiators because "[t]here was general consent among the
majority of the countries in the discussions on Anti-dumping
... Duties that circumstances might arise in which such
duties may properly be applied.".
N See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 405-06.
80 GATT, supra note 9, art. VI, paras. 1-2.
81 See EEC--Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components,
GATT Doc. L/6657 para. 5.17 (1990) (describing article VI as
exception to General Agreement).
82 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 411.
Article VI is an exception because antidumping
duties are applied in addition to the normal duty imposed on
the imports from the country concerned. As a result, imports
from the dumping country are treated less favorably than
imports of nondumping countries, thus deviating from the GATT
norm of nondiscriminatory treatment.
See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 155.
Furthermore, because article VI permits governmental
interference through the imposition of antidumping duties, it
23
But the article also is careful to limit the scope of this
exception by imposing an affirmative obligation upon GATT
contracting parties to use only narrowly circumscribed
t t t d . Mmeasures 0 coun erac umplng.
Because antidumping duties easily can be used as a
protectionist device,84 the GATT contracting parties
occasionally have attempted to update the antidumping laws
to respond to the realities of international economic
relations. Following the failure of a previous Antidumping
85Code, the contracting parties negotiated the Antidumping
is somewhat incongruous with GATT's principle of trade
liberalization.
83 See J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 411; see
also EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT
Doc. L/6657 para. 5.17 (1990) (article VI recognizes
legitimacy of certain policy objectives but at same time sets
out conditions as to obligations that may be imposed to secure
attainment of that objective).
84 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 226. Problems often result from antidumping procedures such
as miscalculations of the margin of dumping and inaccurate
injury determinations. Such activity can cause distortions of
international trade and transform the antidumping duties into
a protectionist device.
85The Antidumping Code of 1967 was negotiated as part of
the Kennedy Round (1962-1967) of trade negotiations. See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, GATT
Doc. L/2812 (1967), reprinted in BISD, supra note 9, at 24,
24-35 (15th Supp. 1968). It generally is agreed that the
Antidumping Code of 1967 and the Kennedy Round were
unsuccessful in reducing nontariff barriers. See L. Glick,
supra note 35, at 8 (little progress in nontariff arena at
Kennedy Round); J. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 14, at 229
("[T]he Kennedy Round made little dent on the plethora of
ingenious nontariff barriers .... "); J. Jackson, J. Louis
& M. Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round 164 (1984)
(United States not living up to its 1967 antidumping Code
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Code of 1979,86 which provides for significant procedural
and administrative changes designed to guard against
protectionist abuse in the administration of the antidumping
87laws.
Together, GATT and the Antidumping Code require a
showing of a disparity between a product's export price and
its "normal" price88 and proof of material injury or threat
of material injury to the competing domestic industry.89 If
both conditions are met, the importing country may apply
antidumping duties.90 Thus combined, article VI of GATT and
obligations).
86 See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 31 U.S.T. 4919,
T.I.A.S. No. 9650 (1979) [hereinafter Antidumping Code of
1979], reprinted in BISD, supra note 9, at 171, 171-87 (26th
Supp. 1980). It was negotiated as part of the Tokyo Round
(1973-1979). The legal instruments adopted at the Tokyo Round
are reprinted in BISD, supra note 9, at 3, 3-188 (26th Supp.
1980). See L. Glick, supra note 35, at 15-150; J. Jackson, J.
Louis & M. Matsushita, supra note 85, at 164.
87 See L. Glick, supra note 35, at 110-11.
88The "normal" price is usually the "home market price."
See GATT, supra note 9, art. VI, para. l(a); J. Jackson, World
Trading System, supra note 14, at 227.
89 See GATT, supra note 9, art. VI, para. 1. Injury is
based on positive evidence and an objective examination of the
volume of the dumped imports, their effect on prices in the
domestic market, and the impact of those imports on domestic
producers. Antidumping Code of 1979, supra note 86, art. 3,
para. 1.
90 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 227. Such duties must remain consistent with the rules in
GATT and the Antidumping Code of 1979. See id. at 227-28.
Note that GATT does not impose an obligation on
contracting parties to act when dumping occurs. Rather, it
25
the Antidumping Code of 1979 represent the current
international commitments concerning dumping and provide the
means of redress available to contracting parties.91
B. The Current Trends and Inadequate Relief
1. Wide Spread Use of Antidumping Laws
It is clear that the antidumping code is too vague due
to the ambiguity of the terminology. This vagueness has
allowed the national jurisdictions to implement unilateral
interpretations, either in law or in practice, and claim
GATT consistency where it may not be exist. In the absence
of clear guidance from the code, such claims are hard to
refute.
It would seem that many of the interpretations adopted
by the four jurisdictions(the United states, the E.C.,
Australia and Canada) either clarify unclear and opaque
elements of the antidumping code or deal with issues that
were simply not addressed in the code.
The difficulty with these unilateral interpretations
is that they typically go in the direction of facilitating
merely permits them to act against dumping.
91 See J. Jackson, World Trading System, supra note 14,
at 227. The Antidumping Code, like all other codes resulting
from the GATT Rounds, is not an amendment to GATT but is a
"stand-alone" treaty binding in theory only upon those GATT
parties who are signatories to that code.
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antidumping findings and/or expanding the scope of
antidumping measures. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that interpretations proposed in one jurisdiction may
be justified on the ground that other jurisdictions have
adopted similar or even broader interpretations. As a
result, after twenty years of use, the code has led to the
evolution of four hybrid systems in the united states, the
E.C., Australia and Canada. Moreover, rules of GATT are
subject to use Antidumping procedures because they are
static, fixed for over a decade and exposed to abuse by
import-competing firms with the motive, money and the time
to find and exploit their loopholes. As with the political
constitutions, what counts is less the rules themselves than
the balance established between the institutions of
relatively equal power but driven by different motives.
There is no balance in the current GATT Antidumping rules:
firms are the driving force of the mechanism; the public
authorities are merely its enforcers.~
Meanwhile, the GATT system possibly permits the use of
antidumping actions as a way of discouraging distortions of
competition, and it concentrates on price discrimination.
This is not unambiguously bad since, under certain
circumstances, price discrimination may exploit a monopoly
(with perfect price discrimination being the best way of
92 t . k 1. 1 t' dSee Pa rlC A. Messer ln, Comp e lng Uruguay Roun 120
(edited by Jeffrey J. Schott, Institute for International
Economics) (1990).
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exploiting a monopoly). Unfortunately, the current system
cannot differentiate between good and bad cases of price
discrimination, as discussed in section 2 supra. The
national rules are under attack since they impose costs on
the consumer without taking into account whether the dumping
is in fact injuring the importing nation, let alone the
world as a whole.
A grave flaw in the current antidumping scheme is its
failure to deter injurious dumping adequately.93 Presently,
dumping is a risk-free, no-lose proposition to the extent
that relief is entirely prospective.94 Moreover, foreign
companies have been ingenious in their ability to circumvent
the imposition of even a prospective antidumping duty.
Whatever the countries do with respect to legislation,
companies are always many years ahead. Evasive activities
include "hit and run" dumping, 95 inventory dumping, 96 short
93 See Hearing on S. 1655 Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on
the JUdiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 9 (statement of Sen.
Heinz) (1985).
94 See Hearing on S. 1655 Before the Subcomm. on
international Trade of the Senate Corom. on Finance, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 58 (testimony of Barton C. Green, General
Counsel and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.) (1986);
ide at 65 (testimony of William Knoell, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Cyclops Corp.); 133 Congo Rec. S5615 (daily
ed. Apr. 28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Specter).
95 See Memo from Finance Comm. Trade Staff to Finance
Corom. Members (1986), reprinted in 1986 Hearing, id., at 7;
1986 Hearing, id., at 58 (statement of Barton C. Green,
General Counsel and Secretary, American Iron and Steel Inst.) ;
1985 Hearing, supra note 93, at 48 (testimony of Richard o.
Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson); 133 Congo Rec. S8690
(daily ed. June 25, 1987) (testimony of Richard o. Cunningham,
28
1.f 1 d . 97 d' . d' 98 d t t .1 ecyc e umplng, lversl0nary umplng an s ra eglc
d
. 99umplng.
"Hit and run" dumping occurs most often in cyclical
and seasonal markets. Where there is a sharp, sudden, and
cyclical downswing in demand, there is a major incentive for
companies to increase export sales, even below fully
allocated costs. This may be done to minimize a seasonal
devaluation in the price of a product. In this instance, any
damage to a domestic industry occurs before any antidumping
action can be prepared and filed. In inventory dumping,
foreign manufacturers can dump inventory by setting up
subsidiary companies in the united states to import
Partner, steptoe & Johnson). see also, Alford, supra note 77,
at 698.
96 See 1986 Hearing, supra note 94, at 58 (testimony of
Barton C. Green, General Counsel and Secretary, American Iron
and Steel Inst.); 1985 Hearing, supra note 93, at 48-49
(testimony of Richard o. Cunningham, Partner, Steptoe &
Johnson); 133 Cong. Rec. S8690 (daily ed. June 25, 1987)
(same).
97 See Memo from Finance Comm. Trade Staff to Finance
Corom.Members (1986), reprinted in 1986 Hearing, supra note
131, at 7.
98 See R. Alford, supra note 77, at 696. ; see also T.
Vakerics, D. Wilson & K. Weigel, Antidumping, countervailing
Duty and Other Trade Actions, 24 n.66 (Supp. 1989)
(diversionary dumping subject to new 1988 laws when parts sent
to third country to be made into final product or when third
country used to circumvent antidumping order on final
product) .
99 See Steven F. Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of
Market Share, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 695 (1990).
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inventory and sell merchandise manufactured in the foreign
plant. Dumping occurs from the domestic subsidiary only
after the merchandise has passed through customs. Because
duties can be imposed only upon the crossing of a border,
such activity is immune from any possibility of a duty.
Short life-cycle dumping occurs when there is a fast
turnover of or a short life span of a product because of
expanding technology. By the time a dumping case can be
brought, the market has moved on to the next generation of
products. Diversionary dumping occurs when a foreign
industry sends its product into another market to avoid the
preexisting duty that would be imposed on the product if it
were imported directly into the country from the country of
origin. In the type of strategic dumping, producers do not
cover the incremental or variable costs of serving the low-
cost market. The incremental profit from the sales of the
product in another market is negative, and the additional
cost of the later market exceeds the additional earnings
that come from that market. Such pricing may seem
irrational, but in fact may be part of a long term,
strategic plan for growth. Indeed, the new thinking in trade
policy argues that comparative advantage no longer
adequately explains the trade flows seen in the world today.
More powerful explanations of trading patterns are "scale
economies"lOo in production(which can occur irrespective of
100 See S. Benz, ide
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comparative advantage), cumulative experience conferred on
first movers, and the advantage of innovation .... certain
industries may generate important spillover effects in the
rest of the domestic economy, particularly in the area of
improved technology.
It could be argued that such dumping is most likely to
occur as a direct result of government policy. However,
large conglomerate corporations would be capable of
exploiting the gains from expanding the scale of production,
benefiting from the learning by doing experience(learning
curve experience), and from entering the market before
competing producers.
The existing prospective remedy cannot prevent such
dumping activity because the foreign industry has raised its
prices above the discriminatory level by the time a dumping
proceeding is brought or a final order is issued. One
proponent of retrospective remedies for dumping noted that
the pendency of a dumping case actually encourages a foreign
producer to ship in as much as it can prior to the
conclusion of the case and the issuance of the final dumping
order to avoid any duty. 101
wide spread use of Antidumping procedures in four
jurisdictions occurs because, in comparison to safeguard
WI See 1985 Hearing, supra note 93, at 8 (statement of
Sen. Heinz); 133 Congo Rec. S8725 (daily ed. June 25, 1987)
(same) .
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1 102 t t .d' d' .aws, access 0 An 1 umplng proce ures lS eaSler,
requirements more transparent, and the probability of an
unexpected outcome lower. Also, while Antidumping is a less
efficient instrument than a non-discriminatory action, it
will have some protective effects, especially in the short
term.
Particularly, in the European Community antidumping
legislation is the most attractive route for firms to take
if they desire to obtain relief from import competition, as
private parties do not have direct access to the safeguard
laws in the E.C ..103 One might expect that safeguard
procedures should be more attractive to firms hurt by import
competition than Antidumping. There is an extra burden of
proof associated with Antidumping: showing that dumping has
occurred. Both procedures require that injury be
demonstrated. Also, it may not be much of a constraint to
demonstrate that dumping has occurred as it can be expected
to take place under a wide variety of circumstances.
Further, to the extent that methods of determining the
dumping margins by the investigators are flexible,
demonstration of dumping may even be possible in cases where
home and foreign price are identical. In EC investigations,
102 See Bernard M. Hoekman and Michael P. Leidy, Dumping
Antidumping and Emergency Protection, 23 J. of World Trade 38
(1989) .
103 See Christopher. Norall, New Trend in Antidumping
Practice in Brussels, The World Economy 97-117 (1987).
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typically, procedures appear to be biased in terms of both
finding dumping and determining dumping margin.104
Given that establishment of dumping often may not be
much of a constraint, all the other procedural aspects of
dumping laws are more likely to lead to a positive finding
than those under safeguard procedures. The latter is subject
to political discretion, as there is a need to take into
• 105account reta11ation or compensation. GATT language ,
after all, allows the retaliation if emergency protection is
imposed in those cases where compensation has not been
offered, or is deem to be inefficient. This is not the case
under Antidumping procedures since dumping has been defined
to be counteravailable as long as injury can be shown. 106
But the injury requirement of Antidumping procedures is less
stringent(easier to satisfy) than the one under safeguard
procedures. Art. XIX of the GATT speaks of "serious" injury,
while Antidumping language (Art. VI) speaks of "material"
injury. Neither is well defined, but in national
implementing language, the serious injury is a more
stringent criterion than the material injury. 107 Also, in
104 B .. dl h . f tSee r1an. H1n ey, T e Des1gn 0 For ress Europe,
Financial Time, London, Jan. 6, 1989.
105 See GATT, supra note 9, art. XIX.
106 See B. Hoekman and M. Leidy, supra note 102, at 38.
107 See Wisley K. Cain, A Case for Repealing the
Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 Law and
Policy International Business 681 (1981) and J. Jackson, The
Role of GATT in Monitoring and Promoting Adjustment: the
Safeguard System, Research Seminar in International Economics
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the safeguard procedures, most countries require
policymakers to take into account the effect of imposing
protection on the economy as a whole. This will reduce the
likelihood of an affirmative action. Related to this is the
possibility that foreign policy considerations may inhibit
action on the part of the policymakers. This is less likely
to occur in the case of Antidumping. The laws stipulate the
necessary conditions for an affirmative finding. If these
are met, Antidumping duties will be imposed (unless aVER,
Voluntary Export Restraint, is negotiated or the exporter
makes an undertaking to remove the injury). If they are not
met, a negative determination will follow. Furthermore,
antidumping actions are permanent in the sense that there is
no automatic degressivity of the measures imposed or time
limits to these actions.
Finally, domestic import competing firms may prefer
Antidumping laws because provisional measures are available.
Even if the investigation determines that no injury
occurred, provisional measures may be sufficient to inhibit
exporters. In the first place, these provisional measures
may lead to substitution of demand away from the products
under investigation. Once trading relationships have been
severed, they may be difficult to re-establish. Also, risk-
averse importers may not want to be affiliated with
producers that are "tainted", and that may be the target of
Discussion, Paper No. 190, U. of Mi. (1986).
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other actions. Secondly, the existence of provisional
measures tends to increase the pressure on the exporters to
agree to a VER. From the perspective of international trade,
VERs(GATT-incompatible measures) are dangerous because they
create a "coalition for protection" between the exporters
and the import-competing industries, getting benefits from
the guaranteed market share.
2. Strategic Use of the Antidumping Measures
a. Corporate Strategy
Antidumping measures could be favored in corporate
strategies because it offers import competing firms a
powerful instrument for raising their rivals' costs.
Domestic industries seek to reduce price competition in
their market by pursuing antidumping actions to coerce
foreign suppliers to maintain minimum import prices. 108
Anticircumvention rules provide a good example. If
adopted, as in the Dunkel Drafts, these rules would force
the efficient firms to invest in countries that have no
initial comparative advantage. The ultimate consequence
would be that foreign firms would be induced to forgo any
possibility of arbitrage in the future among the markets
supplied by their various plants; in other words, the
1M See P. Messerlin, supra note 92, at 126.
35
results would be to create the trade barriers for the
lifetime of the plants.
Another strategic use involves plants specializing in
export sales.w9 The profitability of such plants can be
hurt by antidumping measures restricting their exports. If
there is no other way to divert the plants' output without
incurring large losses, the plants' value - and possibly
that of the exporting firm's assets generally - will be
artificially reduced; thus opening the door for the original
complainant to buy the plant at an artificially low price
and then restore the plant to profitability by securing the
removal of the antidumping measures. And the explanation of
subtle antidumping action might be that complaints try to
persuade the exporting nation to remove the barriers that
facilitates the domestic monopoly power in that country.
They utilize antidumping measures for the competitive
110purposes.
b. Getting away with the legal traps of antidumping
law and sec. 482 of the u.s. Internal Revenue Code
(Circumvention and Circumvention)
1~ Id. at 127.
110 See R. Denton, supra note 6, at 225.
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.. 1 111. f th 1 .Under the U.s. ant1dump1ng aw, 1 e sa es pr1ce
a U.S. affiliate charges to the first unrelated purchaser in
the United statutes is too low, the product may be found to
have been "dumped" in the U.S. market. On the other hand,
the transfer price for products imported into the united
states from an affiliate is too high, then the U.s. importer
can run into Sec. 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. I want
to point out the reasons for, and the mechanics of, the two
statutory provisions and how U.S. companies (subsidiaries)
may seek to avoid the traps of these two laws.
When sales are made by a foreign producer to a related
U.s. company, the antidumping law does not examine the
transfer price between the two related parties; rather, it
examines the first arm's-length transaction in the U.s. (in
other words, the sales price charged to the first unrelated
U.s. purchaser). Using the price to the first unrelated
purchaser avoids the problems inherent in using transfer
prices, which can reflect objectives regarding the
distribution of income within a corporate family, rather
112than market value of the product concerned. Transfer
price may be a factor in the calculation of certain charges
and adjustments to the price charged to the first unrelated
purchaser. This price may be subject to scrutiny in an
111 Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, sec. 731-738 (19
U.S.C. 1673-1673i, 1988).
112 See sec. 482, I.R.C.(Internal Revenue Code).
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antidumping investigation if the merchandise imported by the
foreign firm's related u.s. affiliate undergoes further
manufacture or assembly in u.s. prior to its sale to the
first unrelated u.s. purchaser.1U
A foreign manufacturer with a u.s. affiliate tries to
minimize the risk and potential magnitude of a tax
adjustment or antidumping duty liability. Regarding the
antidumping law, to avoid the antidumping liability the
point for pricing is to ensure that u.s. price are not
generally lower than prices comparable goods in the home or
the third country markets. The lower u.s. prices are in
relation to home and third country prices, the more likely
that it could be found to be dumped in u.s ..
The way to avoid the dumping allegations by u.s.
producers and the antidumping duties is to charge a
relatively high price to unrelated purchasers in u.s ..
However, the higher that price is in relation to the
transfer price between the u.s. company and its foreign
affiliate, the greater the u.s. affiliate's potential tax
liability. To minimize the tax liability under these
circumstances, the related u.s. and foreign companies may
decide to increase the transfer price. However, if the
transfer price is increased, it would be more likely to be
found the underpaYment of income taxes for the u.s.
treasury.
113 See 19 C.F.R. sec. 353.41 (e) (3) (1989).
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By establishing both internal transfer prices and
external prices to unrelated customers, the efforts, to
avoid the collision with either or both antidumping and tax
laws, seem to be continued. And also, a transformation of
u.s. sUbsidiary into a "branch" becomes a trend in favor of
both matters of jurisdiction and tax minimization,
particularly relating to the foreign manufacturer with a
u.s. affiliate.
c. Bilateral Agreement
On the other hand, far from the protectionism being on
the wane, bilateral agreements appear to be the norm in
solving the world trading problems.114 Despite the
contracting parties' commitment to a standstill on trade
restricting measures during the course of Uruguay Round, so-
called "gray area" measures comprising Voluntary Export
Restraints, market-sharing arrangement, and the other
measures designed to circumvent GATT rules continue to
proliferate, bringing to an estimated 50 percent the share
of the world merchandise trade that is in effect "managed"
115in one way or other. These trends have not helped
meaningful progress of the multilateral negotiation. We must
114 See BIS(Bank of International Settlement) Analysis in
Annual Report; GATT: World Protectionism Increasing Despite
Uruguay Round,S ITR 991 (1992).
115 Id.
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note the rise of "process protectionism", the threat of or
the recourse to measures such as antidumping duty
investigations designed to discourage imports or provoke
export restraints. Bilateral deals such as the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement impinge on the area previously
regulated under the GATT and also raise questions about the
role of the bilateral agreement in the open global trading
system based on the principles of the non-discrimination and
most-favored nation treatment.116 For the developing
countries, these deals must be considered that the fear of
the "fortress Europe" will be realized if the other major
trading powers of the world unite in an economic arrangement
that provokes the E.C. into adopting more restrictive
1" 117po J.cJ.es.
3. Inadequacy of Antidumping Laws.
U.S. national antidumping law, exercised under the
auspices of the GATT118, may no longer be up to its
116 See GATT, supra note 9, Art. III, Para 1 and Art. I.
117 See J. Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, at 38 (Policy
Analysis in International Economics No. 27, 1989).
118 See GATT, supra note 9. Part II, Article VI of the
GATT, as modified by Protocol Modifying Part II & Article XXVI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
62 Stat. pt. 3, at 3679, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, 62 U.N.T.S. 80
(entered into force Dec. 14, 1948); Protocol Modifying Part II
and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, supra, 62 Stat. pt. 3, at 3682, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at
5, 62 U.N.T.S. at 86. An international Antidumping Code was
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assigned task. Indeed, the GATT antidumping code was drafted
long ago to deal mainly with goods that could be dumped on
to the dockside in sacks. The code cannot cope with
high-tech products whose prices reflect obsolescence
measured in months and are exported through complex
worldwide networks by firms.119
At the same time, antidumping law may be largely
inadequate in addressing the results of what in many cases
is a systemic, coordinated industrial strategy. Since u.s.
antidumping law is only effective in one national market, it
is seriously limited; it is over inclusive and its remedies
are of limited benefit to producers since they provide no
help in third markets. The reasons for such inadequacy are
as follows.
First, for instance, u.s. antidumping law is
overinclusive in that it makes even above-cost price
discrimination between national markets, where demand
elasticities are unmatched, vulnerable to attack. This can
occur because dumping under the 1921 Antidumping Act does
signed by the GATT Contracting Parties in 1968 in a bid to
unify national antidumping laws.; Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S.
No. 6431, 650 U.N.T.S. 320 (entered into force July 1, 1968).;
However, a grandfather clause allowed inconsistent
legislation, and the U.S. antidumping laws were permitted to
be administered regardless of the more stringent GATT
standard.; Protocol of Provisional Application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 6
at A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
119 See Protectionism's Clever Wheeze, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3,
1988, at 16.
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not require a finding of below-cost sales. Instead, a sale
of a product at "less than fair value"{LTFV) can be found
.. d .. f .t b I 120even 1f the fore1gn pro ucer pr1ce 1S pro 1 a e.
Pricing activity that can violate the 1921 Antidumping
Act is much clearer (even if theoretically suspect) than
pricing activity which can constitute predation under the
Sherman Act. As a result, a dumping violation may exist even
where a predatory pricing violation of the antitrust laws
has not taken place; a situation in which pricing is not
below average variable or marginal cost may constitute
dumping, but not predation. 121
Another limitation of national antidumping law is that
duties can only be applied in each national market. While
large, duplicative transaction costs are involved in
prosecuting each antidumping case, below-cost pricing
activity may continue in third-country markets where the
antidumping remedy is not available or has not been invoked.
Moreover, although the successful prosecution of an
antidumping case does result in the imposition of additional
duties, thus raising the domestic price of the dumped
product, antidumping remedies are limited in that the duties
do not directly benefit the injured producer. The cost of an
antidumping action falls on the producer in the low-price
120 19 U.S.C. s 1677{b) (1982).
121 See Gilbert B. Kaplan & Susan Haggerty Kuhbach, The
Causes of Unfair Trade: Trade Law Enforcers' Perspective, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 447-48 (1987).
123
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market, and a successful action merely restores its
competitive position.
Also, the dumping laws are reactive rather than
preemptive and do not take effect for a number of months
after dumping has commenced. 122 Antidumping duties can be
applied prospectively only, and do not remedy injuries from
123the past.
Finally, the clearest indication of the failure of the
antidumping laws to prevent the predatory behaviors through
dumping is shown by the fact that following repeated dumping
campaigns,
a number of foreign companies have captured a
122 f I d' t ... d fA success u umplng ac lon requlres eVl ence 0
injury to the domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. s 1673(2) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). By the time domestic companies collect
evidence, the below-cost sales must have already inflicted
substantial damage. In addition, following the filing of a
case, the U.S. government generally takes between 280 and 420
days, depending on the complexity of the case. See Thomas R.
Howell, Steven F. Benz & Alan W. Wolff, International
Competition in the Information Technologies: Foreign
Government Intervention and the U.S. Response, 22 Stan. J.
Int'l L., 251 n. 146 (1986).
As a result of time constraints, the Commerce
Department may not impose a duty reflecting the actual dumping
margin until two years or more have passed since the dumping
practice began. See Howell, Benz & Wolff, Id., at 251 n. 146.
A successful antidumping case results in a final affirmative
determination and the imposition of an ad valorem duty, which
may decline if the price of the dumped commodity continues to
go down. The final duty may be raised to accommodate this
phenomenon, but only following a statutory annual review which
occurs more than one year following the final affirmative
determination. 19 U.S.C. s 1675(a) (1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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major, and in some cases dominant, share of the
target market in product areas covered by
antidumping orders The imposition of
antidumping duties suggests that dumping pays:
the competitive benefits reaped from dumping
outweigh the cost of antidumping duties. Foreign
firms can simply absorb the duties as a "routine
cost" of doing business abroad. 124
124 See Howell, Benz & Wolff, Id., at 251-52.
III. THE "DUNKEL DRAFTS" AND AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND125
The Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations in the
GATT has become a focal point for world trading policy in
the late 1980s and 1990s, and the outcome of the round will
go far to determine the future of global trading system. The
Uruguay Round started its negotiations with two interrelated
goals: to blunt protectionist pressures that were eroding
support for the multilateral trading system and to bring the
GATT up to date by extending the coverage of its rules to
important areas of international trade not subject to, or
inadequately covered by, existing GATT provisions. To
achieve such results, two critical challenges had been
faced: to renew the confidence in the efficacy of the
multilateral disciplines of the GATT and to provide a viable
alternative to unilateral actions as well as bilateral and
regional trading arrangements.
The Uruguay Round agenda was ambitious because diverse
interests and the needs had shaped it. Many wanted
negotiations on dispute settlement, safeguards and subsidies
because of the increasingly protectionist practices that had
125 See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10.
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cropped up since the Tokyo Roundu6, in Geneva(1973-79) , to
bypass the stronger enforcement mechanisms instituted during
tha t Round. 127
During the 1980s, antidumping has emerged as the
dominant mode of the protection in the manufacturing trade
area. More than 2000 antidumping cases have been filed in
128the past decade alone. Furthermore, many antidumping
actions have been terminated by agreements to fix minimum
prices and quantitative restrictions on the product in
question. As a result, industries such as steel and
chemicals in the united states and electronics in the
European Communities, are increasingly modeled by
t t .. t d t . t .t .. t t 129 hpro ec lonlS s an an lcompe 1 lve lns rumen s. T e
protective effects of the antidumping are powerful enough to
threaten the trade liberalization envisaged in the Uruguay
Round.
A. Recurrent Dumping and Protecting Protection
During Uruguay Round, both the united states and the
European Community have proposed extending the antidumping
code to cover so-called new issues. Their proposals conceive
126 See A. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 23.
127 See Loretta F. Smith, The GATT and International
Trade, 39 Buff. L. Rev. 919 (1991).
128 See P. Messerlin, supra note 92, at 108.
129 Id., at 109.
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relief from dumping as a paramount right and openly aim at
making AD actions more "effective". New concepts of issues
would be "recurrent injurious dumping" and "repeated
corporate dumping".
t ... 1301. Recurren InJurlous Dumplng
Recurrent injurious dumping would occur when a foreign
exporter of a product already restricted under the previous
antidumping measure undertakes changes in its production to
avoid application of the antidumping measures; foreign
exporters used to be persuaded, or be forced, to undertake
to revise prices so as to eliminate the dumping margin, the
injury, or, more drastically, to cease exports. 131; price
undertakings have been used by the European Community from
the outset, and a high proportion of European Community
antidumping cases are concluded by this undertakings.
Two types of recurrent injurious dumping are
considered. They roughly correspond to the concept of
"circumvention" which the European Community has developed
in its own proposal.
The first type comprises situations where the changes
are "so minor" that a de novo investigation of dumping and
130 Id., at 125.
131 See J. Bellis, The EEC Antidumping System, in
Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study, supra note
64, at 52 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989).
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injury is deemed unnecessary. 132 If circumvention is found
to exist, antidumping duties will be applied from the time
the inquiry is instituted. The second type involves more
significant changes in production. For instance, in one
situation, the original exporters export parts for assembly
by a related party in the importing country, and the value
of the parts is less than a certain percentage(to be fixed
by the code) of the total value of the finished product. In
another situation, a third country producer related to a
previously investigated firm exports the product covered by
the original dumping finding. Cases of "significant" change
in production would require full investigations, but with
more expeditious rules and procedures because of the related
prior dumping.
Repeated corporate dumping133 would occur when a
single corporate entity engages in repeated dumping in a
single national market across the same general category of
merchandise. Again the imposition of the duties would start
from the initiation of the investigation.
These important issues may have a vital impact on the
foreign investment and on the corporate planning, and had a
high priority in the GATT negotiation.
132 See Messerlin, supra note 92, at 117.
133 Id.,atl18.
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2. Protecting Protection
Whether "recidivist" dumping will occur is determined
by the type of antidumping measures taken. It is
unprofitable for any dumper to dump again if the cost
imposed by the antidumping measure is greater than the
benefit it received through a price undertaking(a negotiated
fixing of a minimum increase), where the gains (the rent
associated with price increase) may be higher than what the
d h d t t f th . d ... t . 134umper ope 0 ge rom e prlce lscrlmlna lone
. k . ft' th t . 135PrlCe underta lngs are requen ln e E.C. prac lces,
and the way in which the United states enforces duties leads
to a kind of de facto price undertaking. Existing
antidumping measures, thus, induce foreign exporters to dump
again.
High antidumping duties trigger circumvention, just as
high taxes trigger tax fraud. Anticircumvention cases are a
sign that domestic lobbies have been so successful in
obtaining high duties, and so successful in producing
competitive products, that the construction of foreign-owned
assembly plants in importing countries has become the most
viable solution, as discussed in Section B of part II.
134
See Howell, Benz & Wolff, supra note 122, at 251-52.
135 See Council Regulation (EEC) , Art. 16 of reg. 2176/84:
Provisional Antidumping duties can be imposed if an
Undertaking is breached.
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B. Is the "Dunkel Drafts" a Perfect Text?
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, on December 20,
1991, GATT Director-General "Arthur Dunkel" issued a draft
agreement on most of the topics covered by the round,
including a new GATT Antidumping Code.1~ Because the
countries involved were unable to agree on much of anything,
the Dunkel antidumping Draft was written by personnel in the
GATT Secretariat, and was not a product of negotiation. 137
Although the GATT antidumping draft contains more detail
than the existing Code, particularly with respect to the
calculation of antidumping margins, any claims of
methodological precision are vastly inflated.
From the perspective of the use of unfair trade laws,
the Dunkel text would make antidumping duty cases more
expensive to bring and more difficult to win. Under the
Dunkel text, even cases that are won will result in less
effective relief of shorter duration. Moreover, almost all
of the key provisions are subject to multiple
interpretations and lack of clarity is likely to spawn a
great deal of litigation.
For ease of reference, the following analyses is tied
to specific provisions in the Dunkel text.
136 See Dunkel drafts, supra note 10, Part F, pages F.1-
F.30.
137See William D. Hunter, Key provisions of the "Dunkel
Drafts" on Antidumping and Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties, 789 PLIjCORP 13 (1992).
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f d t . 1381. New Cost 0 Pro uc lon
This paragraph allows that up to 20 percent of the
sales analyzed in the home market can be sold at below the
cost of production, but still can be used in order to
determine the dumping margin. It is unlikely that even
extremely low-priced sales (potentially dumped sales) would
be found to have margins when these sales are compared to
home market sales that were sold below the cost of
production. The proposed language for expanding the minimum
threshold will allow this type of distorted comparison.
Furthermore, this proposal would give foreign
manufacturers added flexibility to manipulate prices to
avoid dumping liability. The Dunkel text would also require
that below-cost calculations be determined in accordance
with the accounting principles of the exporting country. The
proposed change may require the use of accounting
methodologies that fail to measure actual costs incurred to
produce the subject merchandise.
1392. start-up Costs
The Dunkel text proposes an adjustment to the cost of
production for start-up costs. The adjustment provides that
138 Dunkel Drafts, Paragraph 2.2.
139 Id. Paragraph 2.2.1.1.
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cost of production will be the costs incurred at the end of
the start-up period, or if that period extends beyond the
period of investigation, the most recent reasonable costs
available.
Allowing an adjustment for start-up costs that are
. . f .t d 1403. M1n1mum Pro 1 an GS & A
Even if it were possible to pinpoint the end of a
for legitimate costs, or any R&D that may have been
expenses
141 19 U.S.C. s 1677 b (e) (1) (3).
140 General, Selling and Administrative
[hereinafter GS & A]; see Id. Paragraph 2.2.2.
The Dunkel text proposes to eliminate the statutory
•. 141 f .m1n1mums 0 ten percent for general expenses and e1ght
incurred at the end of the start-up period does not account
percent for profit when constructed value is used as a basis
profit portion of constructed value on the producer's actual
necessary to begin production. Using only the costs incurred
undertake and still meet its statutory deadlines .
for foreign market value. Under paragraph 2.2.2, basing the
distortive. A producer generally will experience higher
at the end of the start-up period does not provide a
costs at the beginning of this period. Using the lower costs
start-up period, this would be a near impossible task to
reflective of only the end of the start-up period is
representative picture.
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experience would actually serve to reward firms that sell
the subject merchandise at less-than-fair value. Constructed
value is used when home market or third country sales are
not suitable for price comparison purposes, generally
because home market transactions are sold at prices below
their cost of production. A manufacturer that sold
substantial quantities of home market sales below its cost
of production would necessarily earn little profit or incur
a loss on these sales. It is for this precise reason that
below-cost sales are not used to determine foreign market
value. Therefore, use of a company's actual profit
experience on the like product would defeat the very purpose
of using constructed value rather than actual prices.
There is also a problem of quantification of GS & A
expenses because it is unclear whether an actual GS & A
expense amount and an actual profit amount should be based
on the expense and profit experience of the parent
corporation or only on the expense and profit experience of
the subsidiary that manufactures the product subject to
investigation. Additionally, in some companies the parent
corporation incurs GS & A expenses on behalf of its
subsidiaries. If these expenses are not properly allocated
or assigned to each subsidiary the actual expenses could be
understated, resulting in an understatement of the margins
of dumping. For this reason, it is often difficult to
precisely determine "actual" GS & A expenses for specific
products. The Dunkel proposal does not take into account
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these difficulties and could result in an understatement of
margins of dumping by ignoring these market realities.
4. Circumstance of Sale AdjustmentsU2
Once normal value and export price have been
established, adjustments must be made to both in order to
effect a fair comparison between the export price and the
domestic price in the exporting country. But, the legal and
practical application of the adjustments displays a tilt
towards finding dumping. This tilt is most clear in
situations where foreign producers sell in their home and
export markets through related sales organizations. In such
cases, the authorities essentially establish the export
price at an ex-works level while leaving some overhead
expenses in the normal values, thereby inflating the later.
The tilt seems most pronounced in the EECU3• The fact that
the adjustments are not made automatically, but have to be
proven by the foreign producers, may put a heavy evidentiary
burden on those producers and provides the case handlers
assigned to the investigation with a large amount of
discretion.
The Dunkel text requires each national dumping
authority to adjust normal value or foreign market value in
142
See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10, Paragraph 2.4.
143 See E. Vermulst, supra note 72, at 451.
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a foreign respondent's favor for differences in levels of
trade between the home market and the export market, even if
the foreign respondent has not demonstrated its entitlement
to such an adjustment. Indeed, the broad language in the
Dunkel text referring to adjustments for circumstances of
sale can be read to eliminate any burden on a respondent to
demonstrate entitlement to these adjustments.
When a foreign respondent cannot convincingly
substantiate a level-of-trade between the home market and
the export market or some other adjustment that would lower
or eliminate its margin of dumping, then no adjustment
should be awarded. The burden of proof is placed on the
respondent under current law because the respondent is the
only party in possession of the information necessary to
demonstrate entitlement to the adjustment. If a foreign
respondent that is seeking an adjustment cannot come forward
with sufficient evidence to support its claim, then it is
unreasonable to expect the national dumping authority to
generate evidence on its own. A corollary to this principle
is that the evidentiary standard required to establish
entitlement should not be diluted to the point where an
adjustment is made without a solid basis in fact.
While the GATT approach in itself seems sound, it is
too vague to prevent contracting parties from adopting
concrete interpretations that seem at odds with the basic
GATT aim of a fair comparison.
55
• 1445. Averaglng
The Dunkel text proposes that United states prices
will be averaged in investigations. This proposal would
require an alteration to longstanding Commerce Department
practice, which has looked at U.S. prices on a transaction
by transaction basis.
The practical, negative effect of this provision is
that foreign producers will be permitted to dump goods in
the importing countries, so long as they offset those dumped
sales with sales that are not dumped.
Although the Dunkel text provides exceptions to the
use of averaging, the burden of proving the entitlement to
the exception will not be easy to overcome. As a result, the
text will minimize overall dumping margins by charging
higher prices on sales where there is little or no
competition.
6. Cumulation145
The Dunkel Text, like the current Code, has no
l· .t .. l' h 146 •exp lCl provlsl0n on cumu atl0n. T e U.S. ,Mexlco,
144 See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10, Paragraph 2.4.2.
145 cumulation of dumped imports from a variety of
countries in order to meet an injury/causation test; see id.
Article 3.
1~ Tariff Act of 1930, sec. 771(7) (c) (iv), as amended.
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E.C., Canada, Australia and other countries have applied
cumulation rules, which can be particularly harmful to small
and new LDC(less developed countries)'s entrant into
developed countries' markets, despite the absence of any
Code provision. Some have criticized the Dunkel Text's
failure to include an explicit provision authorizing
cumulation of dumped imports from multiple countries when
making an injury determination.
The Dunkel antidumping text omits any reference to
cumulation. Because cumulation is expressly authorized by
h d ft b· d . d 147 •• f f tt e ra Su Sl 1es Co e , om1SS10n 0 any re erence 0
cumulation in the dumping text implies that cumulation is
not permitted in dumping cases. Prohibiting cumulation in
dumping cases would be a major change from current law that
would make it substantially more difficult for domestic
industries injured by imports from several sources
collectively to obtain relief.
Elimination of cumulation will also significantly
increase the burden upon petitioners in establishing injury
by reason of imports. While the principle of cumulation is
set forth in the draft text on the Subsidies Code, this text
states that the only imports to be cumulated are those
subject to countervailing duty investigations. Merely
inserting similar language in the dumping text would imply
147 See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10, "Agreement on
Subsidies and countervailing Measures" ("Subsidies/CVD Draft") ,
Part I, page 1.1-1.49.
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that, while cumulation is permitted of dumped imports and,
separately, of subsidized imports, "cross-cumulation," i.e.,
cumulation of dumped with subsidized imports, is not
permitted. This change is to be considered a more reasonable
way not to allow the potential abuse of current code for
protectionist purpose, in injury determination .
. l" . t' t . 1487. Marglns Ana YS1S ln InJury De ermlna lons
The Dunkel text adds a new factor, "the magnitude of
the margin of dumping", to the list of relevant factors to
be assessed in examining the impact of dumped imports on the
industry. The insertion of this factor suggests that the
commission will now be required to determine whether the
margin is of sufficient degree to cause injury, or to
somehow relate the margin to the pricing practices of the
foreign producers.
The "traditional" injury analysis does not consider
the size of the dumping margin in an injury analysis. Thus,
if a domestic industry is being injured by the price or
volume effects of the imports, the magnitude of the margin
of dumping is irrelevant. Requiring the consideration of the
size of the margin adds an additional difficulty to the
domestic industry's attempt to prove injury in dumping
cases.
148 See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10, Paragraph 3.3.
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st d . 1498. an l.ng
Article 4.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 6.11 would withhold
initiation of an investigation until petitioning domestic
producers have affirmatively proved that they account for an
unidentified "major proportion" of total domestic production
of the like products. Moreover, in a footnote to Article
4.1(i}, the Dunkel text appears to impose a strict
definitional limit on which domestic producers could be
considered related to the exporters and importers of the
dumped imports. The detailed changes proposed by the Dunkel
text are purportedly motivated by a desire to limit
frivolous petitions.
9. De Minimis Standards150
The Dunkel text includes a new de minimis dumping
margin standard of two percent below which antidumping
duties shall not be imposed. This will require a change in
U.s. law to raise the existing 0.5 percent de minimis
standard to two percent. The Dunkel draft provision would
require "immediate termination" of antidumping cases when
the margin of dumping is less than 2 percent. In practical
149 Id. Paragraph 4.1.
150 Id. Paragraph 5.8.
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terms, however, this will have no impact on vast majority of
dumping cases. Moreover, it is established practice in the
E.C. and Canada to consider the dumping margins of less than
1.5 percent to be de minimis, while Australia does not have
a formal de minimis rule.
10. Measures to Prevent Circumvention of Definitive
t'd' t' MlAn 1 ump1ng Du 1es
One of the most significant departures from the GATT
Antidumping Code was the introduction of anticircumvention
b th E 't' 1 152 h t 'Y e uropean Commun1 y 1n Ju y 1987. T a 1S so-
called "parts" amendment. This measure was clearly aimed at
Japanese companies who allegedly were trying to circumvent
the European Community's antidumping laws through the
establishment of normal assembly plants in the European
Community. However, the effective requirement to show at
least 40 percent European content in a "buy European"
format, is a blatant form of protectionism duly censured by
the GATT.
The United states has adopted much less draconian
measures to deal with anticircumvention under the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. In this Act,
additional measures were included to deal with the products
151 Id. Paragraphs 10.4 and 10.5 and Article 12.
152 Art. 13(10) of Council Regulation No. 2423/88 (1988).
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of only minor alterations or limited further assembly in the
U.S./third countries.~3 Such measures can represent a
legitimate means of controlling the circumvention of
antidumping orders and, if properly enforced, should pose no
special protectionist problems. However, given the amount of
discretion involved, there is always the risk that such
measures will be used as protectionist tools.
The addition of the anticircumvention provisions in
Dunkel Draft, is a significant change to the current U.S.
code. Article 12 addresses the problem of circumvention of
antidumping duty orders by assembling the covered
merchandise in the importing country. Paragraph 10.5
addresses the problem of third country assembly of covered
merchandise. Paragraph 10.4 addresses the problem of
"country hopping," whereby respondent companies simply shift
production of the covered article to a third country to
evade the imposition of antidumping duties.
The Dunkel draft's treatment of circumvention requires
a new injury test prior to an affirmative determination of
circumvention, but fails to address diversion of a covered
t· I t th' d t 154. It t' 155ar lC e 0 a lr coun ry, mlnor a era lons or
later-developed merchandise.~6 Article 12 also appears to
153Tariff Act of 1930, Sec. 781 (b)- (d) (1982) .
15419 U.S.C. s 1677j (b) (1)(B)(i).
15519 U.S.C. s 1677j(c).
15619 U.S.C. s 1677j(d).
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specify the conditions under which the antidumping duty
order could be applied to parts of products, thus perhaps
precluding the filing of a dumping case on products and
parts thereof together.
As far as production of the dumped product in the
country of import or in the third countries is concerned,
the rule of origin might provide a logical framework for
reference. The problem is that there are no uniform rules of
origin and that certain jurisdictions have many different
sets of origin rules.
It would seem to be in the interest of all GATT
contracting parties to have uniform rules on circumvention.
Such rules should strike a balance between allowing
legitimate business practices and obstructing clear attempts
to evade the antidumping laws, that is, a balance between
the legitimate corporate investment and planning strategies
and illegitimate circumvention strategies. It should apply
the same standards to domestic and foreign producers
(national treatment requirement).
Finally, the problem is that simple adoption of this
provision would reinforce antidumping measures that are
often used by firms to cartelize the importing market. Thus,
safeguards should be added to insure that anticircumvention
provisions - much like price undertakings - do not encourage
cartel in the importing market. Failure to include such a
provision, however, would likely result in any event in the
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proliferation of unilateral actions to stop the
circumvention of antidumping duties.
15711. Sunset
The Dunkel Text rejects the notion of an automatic
termination clause, and instead adopts the current E.C.158,
Australian, and Canadian procedure, but not the United
States procedure, for reviewing antidumping orders after
five years. The burden falls squarely on the authorities,
not petitioners or respondents, to determine whether the
duties should remain in place in beyond five years, but the
text does make clear that one year without dumping does not
necessarily preclude a finding that the order should
continue in effect.
A potentially serious loophole in the sunset provision
is the absence of a definitive deadline for the completion
of sunset reviews. Without such a dead line, the sunset
provision could prove ineffective, and foreign antidumping
orders could remain in place long after dumping and injury
have ceased.
In sum, weak GATT rules open the door to the
aggressive use of unilateral measures, which can mask
protectionist intent and undermine multilateral process. In
157 See Dunkel Drafts, supra note 10, Paragraph 11.3.
1~ Council reg. No. 2423/88, art. 19, sec 1 (1988).
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the absence of a stronger GATT system, unilateral measures
could easily be deployed with increasing fervor and
frequency.
The Dunkel text on dumping contains a few procedural
improvements in the international codes for exporters
concerned with transparency and fairness in other countries'
implementation of these laws, but the cumulative effect of
the text is still susceptible to multiple interpretations
that result in a proliferation of litigation. Reform of the
GATT antidumping code should impose tighter criteria for
calculation of dumping and bar the use of price undertakings
to resolve the antidumping cases, generating anticompetitive
effects.
c. Suggestions for Improvements
As world economic interdependence has
increased, it has become more difficult to manage
relationships between various economies. This
problem can be analyzed to the difficulties
involved in trying to get two computers of
different makes to work together. To do so, one
need an interface mechanism to mediate between the
two computers. Likewise, in international economic
relations, and particularly trade, some interface
mechanism may be necessary to allow deferent
economic systems to trade together harmoniously.159
Over the past years, the antidumping system has become
one of the most important interfaces in international trade
159See J. Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 7, at 650-51.
1 t· 160re a J.ons. The apparent needs felt for antidumping
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actions are also clear from the fact that even in the
proposed U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreements and in the free
trade agreements between the EEC and EFTA countries,
.d' ... bl 161antJ. umpJ.ng actJ.ons remaJ.n possJ. e. This interface
function would not attempt to cleanse the international
system of distortions, but only to subdue protectionist
pressures by reducing the "unfairness" of foreign commercial
structures. In this light, the international sanctioning of
national rules is a "buffer" which ameliorates the effect of
structural differences when they get to the stage of
intruding on the domestic welfare of the importing
nation.162 The "interface" argument does not suggest that
the antidumping methodology (price discrimination between
home and export market) is the most appropriate way of
dealing with (nor does it, in fact, deal with) the problem
of structural differences. However, it does to an extent
reduce the friction between differing systems. The interface
argument also suggests that maybe national antidumping laws
operate as a de facto safeguard measure because the ability
to effectively reduce trade friction and placate
concentrated producer groups is at least as important a
political function as the maximization of national welfare.
160 See J. Jackson, supra note 14, at 214-21.
161 See Michael Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, supra
note 64, at 326 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds. 1989).
162 See R. Denton, supra note 6, at 240.
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1. Improvements in the Safe-Guards Mechanism
The weakness of the safeguards clause of the GATT Art.
XIX have led to its disuse; instead countries have deployed
a rash of extra-GATT controls(particularly VERs) and often
have used antidumping duties. It could be explained that if
it is tough to use Art. XIX and easy to get relief through
the VERs or antidumping actions, an industry seeking relief
will choose one of the later. So, the revision to
antidumping code and the reform of the GATT safeguards
clause are intertwined in the policies of GATT member
countries.
Before suggesting possible improvements, we need to
recognize that economic rationalization and the injection of
competition considerations might be useful reference points.
From a normative perspective, antidumping actions are
clearly an inefficient way to deal with problems of import
competition. To a large degree, antidumping legislation and
implementing measures act as a system of selective
safeguards. From a multilateral perspective, the general
problem is that the incentives facing firms are biased
toward requesting, and receiving, discriminatory forms of
protection. Thus, to alter the status quo requires that
these incentives be changed. This can be done unilaterally
and multilaterally. Safe-guards and antidumping measures
have been discussed multilaterally in the context of the
Uruguay Round.
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The structural adjustment measures before restricting
imports would be recommended. This approach is related to
the mitigation of pressures that force exporters into aVER
negotiation. On the other hand, lax discipline on
safeguards(such as the sanction of limited selectivity)
would allow some of the present gray-area measures to
continue.1M That is, a relaxation of the conditions
governing the use of Art. XIX could make it easier to
substitute other VER measures.
So, one possibility would be a modification of the
GATT compensation requirement. This could be achieved
through the domestic institutional reform - "effective
adjustment assistance".164 Unfortunately, an adjustment
requirement would pose an added burden for the countries
seeking Art. XIX relief and might further discourage its
use. For example, Sec. 201 of the Trade Act of 1974100has
hardly been used since the adjustment provision was added to
it in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
1M See A draft text of agreement prepared by the group
chairman, Brazilian Ambassador G. Marciel.; The E.C.'s
position in Uruguay Round (GATT Focus, and News of the Uruguay
Round, 1989 and 1990); see also generally C. Hamilton & J.
Whalley, Safeguards, supra note 92, at 85-87.
164See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Protectionism 117 (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1988).; the government can ease the adaptation
to competition from import in two ways.: (1) adjustment
assistance can enhance mobility, and upgrade the quality of
man power and capital. (2) the method of temporary protection
- OMA(orderly marketing agreements) or import restriction
(Tariff or Quota) under the Escape Clause.
10019 U.S.C. sec. 2201 (1982).
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Thus the safeguards system needs revision to provide
incentives to industries to opt for import relief through
the adjustment-oriented Art. XIX approach instead of seeking
other GATT remedies(antidumping actions) or going outside
the statutes entirely and getting political support for
negotiating VERso
If the governments are to resist protectionist
pressures, they will need effective institutional mechanisms
to ease the consequences on workers, firms and communities
of the changes wrought by a more open and integrated world
economy.
In this approach, safeguard protection would be
provided only as increased tariffs, not as quotas, and the
proceeds of the increased tariffs would be used to fund the
adjustment assistance. The tariff increase would decline
over a specified period as adjustment takes place.w6 If
Art. XIX's compensation requirements were suspended during
the period of adjustment, implementation of this adjustment
would be facilitated.
The safeguards arrangements, however, cannot be
evaluated in isolation from the rest of the trading system.
To break the present impasse, it is required for an approach
to safeguards be based on tightening the GATT disciplines on
other import relief measures (gray-area measures,
antidumping, and countervailing measures), rather than
166 Id., at 119.
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relaxing safeguards disciplines (such as through a move to
limited selectivity). The need to link the use of safeguards
actions to adjust assistance to help defuse pressures for
familiar trade-restricting measures in the future, is
inevitable.
2. Substitution for Dealing with Unfair Pricing
Antidumping laws are counterproductive in a market
economy and there could be an option to eliminate that law
in favor of competition law. 167 Antidumping laws tend to
protect competitors, instead of the competitive process and
pose a serious obstacle to free market forces in a global
trading environment. Competition laws, on the other hand,
are more compatible with the international markets that are
becoming more common as the global economy becomes
increasingly integrated. Competition laws promote open
markets in which the entry and expansion of businesses is
not to be hindered by anti-competitive behaviors of existing
firms. If this attitude were applied in the trade policy
area, it would encourage the removal of trade barriers and
167 See, e.g., Antidumping Laws Should be Replaced by
Competi tion Law, Canadian Lawyer Says, 7 Int' I Trade Rep.
(BNA) 729, 729 (May 23, 1990) (antidumping law
counterproductive in market economy); Substantial Reform of
GATT Antidumping Code Seen Difficult To Achieve in Uruguay
Round, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 397, 399 (Mar. 21, 1990) (lack
of competition policy rules in GATT is loophole in current
system). See P. Nicolaides, The Competition Effects of
Dumping, 24 J. World Trade 115 (1990) (arguing that use of
antidumping mechanisms often is anticompetitive).
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stifle any desire to protect domestic competitors.
Consideration should be given to relying on a competition
law approach to price discrimination and predatory pricing
in place of antidumping laws.
The underlying assumption of the antidumping laws is
that the dumping is justifiably prevented because its cost,
i.e. the injury it causes to producers, exceeds its benefits
to users who acquire low priced dumped goods. This
assumption is reasonable enough if dumping is predatory and
hence makes a market less competitive; but, it is not, if
dumping is nonpredatory and enhance competition.1~ The
problem is that a law which condemns all dumping that causes
injury to domestic industry will invariably snag in its net
both predatory and nonpredatory dumping. Dumping(price
discrimination) that is nonpredatory and can enhance the
competition arises if a firm seeks to maximize short run
profits, as opposed to destroying competition.
In trade law, "unfair" tends to be defined in
moralistic terms, based on the legitimacy of competitive
advantages enjoyed by foreign producers. Fair often means
equal treatment, protection of competitors or market shares,
maintenance of the status quo, and other deterrents to
adjustment. Those approaches tend to be frowned upon in
competition law. In most cases, antidumping laws produce
168 See Ivan R. Feltham, Stuart A. Salen, Robert F.
Mathieson and Ronald Wonnacott, Competition (Antitrust) and
Antidumping Laws in the context of the Canada-United states
Free Trade Agreement, 17 Can.-U.S. L. J. 71 (1991).
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results that would not be sustainable under domestic
competition laws. The results tend to run counter to the
proper operation of free markets and therefore have a
negative impact on consumers. In other words, it means that
an antidumping law, rather than promoting any sensible
economic result, is merely a means to discriminate between
domestic and foreign competitors.
The risk of maintaining the antidumping rules would
defeat vigorous price competition that is not predatory and
therefore would inhibit vigorous competition. Moreover, the
risk of having to face antidumping actions could inhibit the
rationalization of dumping and this would be counter the
goal of improving global competitiveness. The predatory
trade would be handled through the provisions of the
competition laws. The healthier degree of price competition
and the efficiency of economy can be augmented by the
replacement of the antidumping laws with the existing
competition laws.
The laws on price discrimination and predatory pricing
are the areas of "particular overlap" between the two sets
of laws and are analogues.w9 Competition laws are thus
seen as the desirable "substitute systems of rules for
d I .. th f' "" 170 t .t . I 171ea lng Wl un alr prlclng. Compe 1 lon aws are
169 Id., at 76.
170 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1907 (1988).
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available to remedy unreasonably low pricing in the form of
predation, requires injury to competition, and takes into
considerations both objective evidence of below cost pricing
and market structure, and evidence of subjective predatory
intent. Thus, their substitution for antidumping laws is an
economically logical and legally feasible option for the
removal of barriers to the future international trade, with
regard to the lack of competition policy rules in the GATT
as the loophole in the Bretton Woods system.
171 Sec. 2 of Sherman Act and to lesser extent Sec. 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the premises of the GATT system, the
international trade system needs some mechanisms which
attempt to control distortive measures, either at the public
or private level. The effectiveness of the international
system must be a significant consideration since there
appears to be an intimate link between the international and
national rules.
The consistent use that is made of antidumping and the
trend that exists in terms of expanding its scope have
implications in the international trading system. In
particular, antidumping offers a discriminatory form of
protection that is often not transparent, and distorts
production, consumption and trade. Its existence is likely
to have implications for any Uruguay Round safeguards
agreement, as in practice antidumping provides alternative
to safeguard-type temporary emergency protection.
Many of the so-called "problems" with existing
antidumping laws evidence a concern not for promoting
competition, but for protecting competitive advantage. In
other words, in applying the antidumping laws, governments
are more producer-oriented than consumer-oriented, and there
needs to return to the core principles of antidumping
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legislation. Various possibilities have been identified in
terms of improving the current situations, all of which can
be implemented on a unilateral basis. However, the value of
unilateral actions will be limited from a global
perspective, and multilateral agreement would be the
preferred option. Thus, by the suggested proposals, it could
be argued that the proper operation of international free
markets encourages antidumping laws to play a limited role
to curb the anticompetitive behaviors (predatory) .172
In sum, national authorities need to administer the
more competition-oriented antidumping policies. But, any
legal framework taken to strengthen and modernize
antidumping laws should be done with a view toward careful
compliance with the principles of GATT. Therefore, It is to
the advantage of all parties to ensure a rational
application of the antidumping laws.
172 See, supra note 167.
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